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VAHID HEYDARI
Computer Science Department, Rowan University, Glassboro, NJ 08028, USA

(e-mail: heydari@rowan.edu)

ABSTRACT In this paper, we introduce a framework for building a secure and private peer to peer
communication used in supervisory control and data acquisition networks with a novel Mobile IPv6-based
moving target defense strategy. Our approach aids in combating remote cyber-attacks against peer hosts
by thwarting any potential attacks at their reconnaissance stage. The IP address of each host is randomly
changed at a certain interval creating a moving target to make it difficult for an attacker to find the host.
At the same time, the peer host is updated through the use of the binding update procedure (standard
Mobile IPv6 protocol). Compared with existing results that can incur significant packet-loss during address
rotations, the proposed solution is loss-less. Improving privacy and anonymity for communicating hosts
by removing permanent IP addresses from all packets is also one of the major contributions of this paper.
Another contribution is preventing black hole attacks and bandwidth depletion DDoS attacks through the
use of extra paths between the peer hosts. Recovering the communication after rebooting a host is also a
new contribution of this paper. Lab-based simulation results are presented to demonstrate the performance
of the method in action, including its overheads. The testbed experiments show zero packet-loss rate during
handoff delay.
INDEX TERMS SCADA, mobile IPv6, moving target defense, dynamic IP.
I. INTRODUCTION

Critical infrastructure, including electricity distribution,
water treatment, petroleum refining, etc., is the backbone of
our nation’s economy, security, and health. Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems perform critical
functions in controlling industrial systems. A SCADA system
includes two main components, a Human Machine Interface (HMI) and a Programmable Logic Controller (PLC).
HMI is a user interface for signaling and controlling the
state of the system. PLC is directly connected to the physical
infrastructure through sensors and actuators. The SCADA
system uses a client/server communication model in which
the HMI is the client that continually sends write and read
commands to the PLC that is the server. In this way, the HMI
can send control parameters or read sensor measurements and
the state of the PLC program. Cyber-attacks on such infrastructure can cause loss of life, threaten public safety/national
security, or impact environmental disasters.
Cyber-attacks can be used to execute injection, replay,
alteration, exploits, and Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks [1].
A cyber-attack may affect a large blackout, disable the safety
monitoring system of nuclear power plants [2], or damage the
system (e.g., STUXNET [3] and HAVEX [4]). The SCADA
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Strangelove project [5] identified 150 zero-day vulnerabilities in SCADA systems. Given these examples, it can be
seen that improving the security of SCADA systems is very
crucial.
In this project, we assume that SCADA networks are
penetrable. The next step after penetrating to the network
is finding and fingerprinting the PLC(s). After finding targets, cyber-attacks can occur on availability and/or integrity
of the system [6]. These attacks can prevent remote monitoring and controlling by a legitimate operator. They can
also fabricate, alter, and/or replay network packets between
the PLC and the HMI [7]. To prevent these cyber-attacks,
we propose a framework for building a secure and private
peer to peer communication with a novel Mobile IPv6 based
Moving Target Defense (MTM6D) strategy [8]–[11] to prevent remote attacks by IP address hopping. Our approach aids
peer hosts to combat remote cyber-attacks by thwarting any
potential attacks at their reconnaissance stage. In MTM6D,
we utilized Mobile IPv6 [12], where there is a permanent IP address—Home Address (HoA)—which is used to
avoid disrupting TCP sessions and a temporary IP address—
Care-of Address (CoA)—which is used to connect to other
nodes. MTM6D dynamically changes the CoA of a host for

2169-3536 2018 IEEE. Translations and content mining are permitted for academic research only.
Personal use is also permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
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moving the target. Note that we treat the hosts as if they
were mobile nodes of Mobile IPv6. MTM6D needs a small
modification in the standard Mobile IPv6 protocol. Providing
dynamic IP addresses only on one node among two connected
nodes is the major shortcoming of MTM6D. More clearly,
MTM6D cannot protect both peers against remote attacks in
the problem subject to investigation. Another shortcoming of
MTM6D is incurring significant packet loss (on high latency
communication links) during address rotations. Lack of privacy and anonymity for communicating hosts is also another
shortcoming of MTM6D. Note that the permanent IP address
should be stored in the home address option/the routing
header type 2 (IPv6 headers) of each data packet that shows
the HoA of the source/destination. Therefore, Man-In-TheMiddle attacks that need to target specific IP address(es) and
other types of attacks against node’s privacy can occur. In this
project, a new version of MTM6D (MTM6D II) is proposed
to resolve the above shortcomings. Furthermore, we propose
a way for preventing black hole attacks, as a part of DoS
attacks (in which a compromised router on the path between
two hosts discards packets instead of forwarding them) and
bandwidth depletion Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS)
attacks (that only need the subnet ID instead of the exact
IPv6 address of a target). A method is also presented to
recover the communication after rebooting a host.
The proposed method (MTM6D II) is designed to meet the
following requirements:
• A static IP address is needed to be transparent to the
upper layers. However, the static IP address should not
be accessible through the Internet. In this way, a dynamic
IP address should be used for connecting to the peer
node.
• Changing the dynamic IP address should not cause any
delay or packet loss in the network.
• Rotating IP addresses should be done independently on
each node. Therefore, a mechanism is needed to update
the peer node with the new IP address.
• The new method should also support dynamic address
rotation intervals such as a shorter rotation interval during suspicious activity and a longer one to decrease the
overhead.
• Adding new requirements or any change in the network
equipment should be avoided.
• Mobility between subnets that changes the prefix of IP
addresses should be supported.
• A combination of standard protocols should be used
instead of creating a new protocol given the point that
the new protocol can add new vulnerabilities and may
have security or scalability problems.
The last requirement listed above has an essential role
in security and scalability. We will show that the proposed
method uses Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) with Internet
Key Exchange version 2 (IKEv2) [13] instead of defining a
new protocol. For example, researchers used covert channels
to provide some level of authentication [14], used TCP Option
field to carry authentication information [15], or embedded
33330

encryption [16], [17] for Modbus/TCP. However, IPsec with
IKEv2 is already providing encryption, authentication, key
distribution/rekeying, and replay attacks protection. As a
result, the proposed method does not depend on a specific
algorithm or key size for encryption, authentication, and key
distribution. This portability feature helps us to implement
this technique for different applications like small low-power
Internet of Things (IoT) devices. For example, the choice
of cryptographic algorithms is left to negotiation steps of
IKEv2 to select an algorithm that both parties support.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the
next section, an overview of the related work is provided
followed by the threat model. Then, some details of Mobile
IPv6 are explained. Then the proposed solution and results
of testing with a prototype implementation are presented
followed by our summary/conclusions.
II. RELATED WORK

This section includes a brief review of previous MTD-based
methods that protect servers against remote attacks. Also,
some of the limitations of these methods are discussed.
Some cloud-based defense methods were presented
in [18]–[20], and [21] for Internet services against DDoS
attacks. These solutions leverage the on-demand availability
of resources in a cloud environment to hide the server’s
location behind a large pool of proxies. Incoming connection
requests from authorized users are redirected by a central
server to these proxies to serve the users subsequent requests.
When under attack, the central server instantiates new proxies
and moves the users associated with attacked proxies to these
new proxies. To prevent next attacks, the central server also
shuffles the client-to-proxy assignment to isolate insiders
who shared the location of the proxies with attackers.
Other cloud-based defense methods, those are based on
Virtual Machine Live Migrations (VM-LM), focused on the
integrity of software before migration [22] or considered the
availability and duration of migration in practice [23]. TALENT [24] is designed for critical infrastructure applications
by migrating to a different platform at random time intervals
when a new vulnerability or attack is discovered. A security
model to assess and compare the effectiveness of these cloudbased MTD methods is presented in [25]. These methods are
treatments in nature, instead of prevention. Detecting flooding attacks could be possible by traffic analysis techniques
like [26] and [27]. However, it is difficult to detect penetration
attacks like remote exploits that take advantage of target vulnerabilities. Therefore, we need to consider both prevention
and treatment to provide an effective security scheme.
An MTD technique called OpenFlow Random Host Mutation (OF-RHM) is introduced in [28]. In this technique,
an address range, selected from the unused network address
space, is assigned to each host. A virtual IP address is chosen
from this range at each mutation interval. A Software-Defined
Networking (SDN) approach is used for range allocation
and mutation coordination. A centralized controller (NOX)
establishes flows in OpenFlow switches to forward requests
VOLUME 6, 2018
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and perform the address translation actions. The virtual IP
addresses will be used for routing and are automatically
translated into the real IP addresses and vice versa at the
network edges (subnet) close to the source/destination. As
the advantages of this method, it is transparent to the end
hosts and does not use any encapsulation method. On the
other hand, the limitations of this method are requiring central
management and new equipment and not supporting mobility.
One of the prevention methods is MT6D [29]. MT6D is a
form of a dynamic network layer MTD that rapidly changes
IPv6 addresses of both the sender and receiver mid-session
without dropping or renegotiating sessions. The design takes
advantage of IPv6 networks allowing nodes to bind new
IPv6 addresses seamlessly. MT6D creates dynamic Interface
IDentifier (IID) obscuration to develop dynamic IP addresses.
These IIDs are comprised of three parts: (1) a value specific
to an individual host (seed IID), (2) a secret (symmetric) key
shared between both parties, and (3) a variable that is agreed
upon by both sides (e.g., time). Out-of-band is suggested for
sharing the seed IID and the key. In this method, peers use
the same algorithm with a pre-shared symmetric key that
generates a random IPv6 address per each time interval based
on the Media Access Control (MAC) address as input. Using
the peer’s MAC address as input is the way to find the peer’s
IP address during the current time interval.
MT6D encapsulates original data packets to Unreliable
Datagram Protocol (UDP) packets to hide the original IP
addresses and uses virtual IP addresses.
The limitations of MT6D for our purpose are as follow:
•

•

•

•
•

Mobility is not supported by this method. For example,
if one host moves to a new subnet (or switches between
two Internet connections), the prefix of its IPv6 address
is changed, and the peer host cannot find it. Note that we
need mobility support to prevent black hole and bandwidth depletion DDoS attacks by switching between
multiple Internet connections.
Packet loss due to address collision exists. As the IP
addresses are dynamically changed, address collision
may occur. Although, because of huge availability of IP
addresses in IPv6, the likelihood of an address collision
is minimal, the connection will be lost during the rotation interval that an address collision occurs.
Key management is lacking. Rekeying is needed to
improve the security, but MT6D lacks support for key
management protocols.
Relatively tight time synchronization is needed.
Dynamic address rotation interval is not supported.
We may need to change the address rotation interval depending on our network situations. For example,
a shorter rotation interval when suspicious activities are
detected is preferred, and a longer one is suitable at other
times to decrease computational (or network) overhead.

Please note that MTM6D II does not have any of the limitations mentioned above. For example, MTM6D II is based
on Mobile IPv6 (to support mobility), uses IPsec/IKE_v2
VOLUME 6, 2018

(to support rekeying), does not need any time synchronization
methods, supports dynamic address rotation interval, and has
zero packet loss rate.
III. THREAT MODEL

We now discuss the threat model. The focus of this research is
on preventing remote cyber-attacks against IP based SCADA
protocols. Modbus/TCP, DNP3, Profinet, and EtherNet/IP
are the main SCADA protocols that operate over IP. Modbus/TCP [30], operates over TCP/IP, is a member of Modbus
protocol family. It was originally developed in 1979 and then
become an open standard. It has a simple client/server communication messaging service for requests and responses.
The Distributed Network Protocol (DNP3) [31] is a set of
communications protocols transported across various physical media, including TCP/IP networks. Its primary use is in
utilities such as electric and water companies. Profinet [32]
is a standard for data communication over Industrial Ethernet
with strength in delivering data under tight time constraints.
It leverages TCP/IP for collecting data and controlling equipment in industrial systems. The Ethernet Industrial Protocol
(EtherNet/IP) [33] also operates over IP. It uses its objectoriented design and adapts the Common Industrial Protocol. EtherNet/IP makes use of both TCP and UDP for explicit
and implicit messaging. As the proposed method in this
paper is implemented in the network layer (IP layer), it is
compatible with all IP based SCADA protocols mentioned
above.
Remote cyber-attacks include special actions which allow
attackers to compromise remote systems. Address-based
DDoS attacks and remote exploits are two main categories
of remote attacks that need to know the IP address of
their intended target(s). Remote exploits take advantage of a
bug or vulnerability to view or steal data or gain unauthorized
access to a vulnerable target.
For this research the cyber-attacks from four categories
are considered; enumeration, confidentiality, integrity, and
availability.
A. ENUMERATION

Step one of a cyber-attack is finding a target. Network
mapping tools, such as NMAP, can be used to search IP
address ranges for connected devices. For example, finding
open ports associated with industrial control system communication protocols; Modbus/TCP, DNP3, Profinet, EtherNet/IP, etc. can help attackers to find PLCs. Once a PLC
is located, additional enumeration techniques are available
to fingerprint the device. This type of information can be
used to identify specific vulnerabilities to exploit against
systems.
B. CONFIDENTIALITY

Attackers may eavesdrop on network communications
between SCADA components to learn details of system operation, and reverse engineer experiment construction.
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C. INTEGRITY

Most SCADA networks do not employ tunneling technologies such as IPSec or SSL to provide network packet integrity
at higher network layers either. As such, network packets
carrying sensor measurements and supervisory commands
can be altered, replayed, or crafted and injected into the
network.
D. AVAILABILITY

Network availability is considered critical for SCADA systems because the network is needed both for monitoring and
controlling the remote physical process. As such denial of
service vulnerabilities are considered significant threats to
SCADA systems.
IV. BACKGROUND

In this section Mobile IPv6, stateless address autoconfiguration, route optimization, binding management, and multiple
CoAs registration are introduced. These concepts are essential for understanding the rest of the study.
A. MOBILE IPv6

Mobile IPv6 is utilized as the base of the proposed method
to take advantage of several of its features. One of the most
important features is its ability in handling the changing IP
address of a Mobile Node (MN) as it moves to other subnets.
Though we do not have real mobility, we treat both parties as
MNs. In Mobile IPv6, an MN has two different IP addresses.
One of them is a permanent IP address, HoA, assigned by
the Home Agent (HA) and another one is CoA, which is
used by others, called correspondent nodes (CN), to reach the
MN. HA is a router on the MN’s home link that functions
similar to a proxy for the MN and keeps track of the CoA
and performs the necessary forwarding. When the MN moves
between subnets and changes its CoA(s), it should update
the HA using Binding Update (BU) messages that contain
new CoA(s). In response, Binding Acknowledgement (BA)
messages can be used to make sure that the HA is updated.
In the default implementation of Mobile IPv6, CNs contact
the MN via its HoA, which is processed by the HA and
tunneled to the MN.
B. STATELESS ADDRESS AUTOCONFIGURATION

IPv6 hosts can use Neighbor Discovery protocol via the
Internet Control Message Protocol version 6 (ICMPv6)
Router Discovery messages for autoconfiguration when they
are connected to an IPv6 network [34]. Hence, each host
can automatically generate global IPv6 addresses without
needing any manual configuration or help of a server. The
neighbor discovery protocol provides powerful mechanisms
that allow hosts to obtain all the necessary information
about their link. Autoconfiguration is started by generating a link-local address for the network interface (tentative
address). Then a Neighbor Solicitation message with the
tentative address as the target is used to check against current
33332

occupancy of the tentative address. If this address is occupied,
the host will receive a Neighbor Advertisement message.
Therefore, this tentative address cannot be employed and
another address should be generated, and the same process
should be repeated.
C. ROUTE OPTIMIZATION

Route optimization is used to forward packets directly
between an MN and a CN (or another MN). In order for
this strategy to work, the CN should hold the MN’s current
CoA. Therefore, the MN should update the CN with the latest
CoA. Before this direct communication, return routability
procedure [12] should be used to verify the right of the MN
to use a specific HoA and to verify the validity of the claimed
CoA. This procedure involves four messages. Following
this process, two additional messages (BU and BA) will be
sent.
After running the route optimization mechanism, packets will be forwarded directly between two MNs (in the
proposed method both parties are MNs). More specifically,
the source and destination IP addresses in each packet’s
header are CoAs of MNs. However, to be transparent to
the upper layers, HoAs (permanent IP addresses) should
be in the packet’s header and swapped with CoAs in the
source and destination. For this purpose, Routing Header
Type 2 and Destination Options Header are defined in Mobile
IPv6 [35].
The routing header type 2 is used by an HA or a CN to carry
the MN’s HoA when packets are sent to the MN’s CoA. For
example, after the route optimization mechanism, a CN (or
another MN) knows the MN’s CoA so that the CN can send a
packet directly to the MN’s CoA, but the MN needs to see its
HoA in the destination IP address. Therefore, the CN stores
the MN’s HoA in the routing header type 2 and the MN’s
CoA in the destination IP address and forwards the packet.
When the MN receives this packet, it automatically swaps the
destination IP address of the packet with the address stored in
the routing header type 2.
The destination options header is used to carry optional
information that needs to be processed only by the destination
node. Home address option is an essential part of this option.
It is used in packets sent by the MN while away from home,
to inform the CN (or another MN) of the MN’s HoA. In turn,
the source address of the packet is the CoA of the MN, and the
HoA of the MN is stored in the home address option. When
the destination receives this packet, the MN’s CoA and HoA
will be swapped if the pair of the CoA and the HoA of the
sender is found as a Binding Cache entry that is explained in
the following.
D. BINDING MANAGEMENT

In this subsection, Binding Update List and Binding Cache
are explained as two data structures needed for direct communication between an MN and a CN (or another MN) based
on the route optimization mechanism.
VOLUME 6, 2018
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1) BINDING UPDATE LIST [12]

Each MN has a Binding Update List (BUL). The BUL records
information for each BU message sent by this MN that
includes all bindings sent by the MN to its HA or CNs (or
other MNs). When a new BU message is sent to the same
destination, the entry of the BUL that stored information
about the previous BU message will be updated with this
new BU message. When a new packet is ready to be sent,
information about the BUL is the key to decide whether this
packet should be sent to the destination directly or via the HA.
The most important fields of each BUL entry are:
• The IP address of a CN (or the HoA of another MN) to
which a BU message was sent.
• The HoA for which that BU message was sent.
• The CoA sent in that BU.
2) BINDING CACHE [12]

Binding Cache, which includes bindings for other nodes,
is used for the route optimization mechanism. Main fields of
Binding Cache are:
• The HoA of the MN for which this is the Binding Cache
entry. This field is the key for searching the Binding
Cache to find whether an entry exists for this destination or not.
• The CoA for the MN indicated by the HoA field in this
Binding Cache entry.
When the MN registers a new CoA, it will subsequently send
BU messages to all of its CNs listed in the BUL. Note that
as a default in the standard of Mobile IPv6, the MN does not
check the Binding Cache when it wants to send BU messages.
That means, BU packets have the destination option header
but do not have routing header type 2.
E. MULTIPLE COAS REGISTRATION

One of the keys to having zero packet loss rate when an MN
changes its CoA for moving the target, is the ability to have
multiple CoAs at the same time. According to the multiple
CoAs registration rules of Mobile IPv6, an MN can utilize
multiple CoAs (over the same HoA) with its HA and/or CNs.
The MN automatically sends BUs to its HA and/or CNs per
each new IPv6 global address that has been registered as its
CoA.
V. PROPOSED SOLUTION

As discussed before, the focus of this paper is on preventing remote attacks against two hosts connected through the
Internet. Towards this goal, we leverage a network layer
moving target defense to avoid each host being targeted for
exploitation. Note that each host can be a computer, a lowpower IoT device, a network gateway, a PLC or an HMI of
SCADA systems.
To better understand the need for the proposed method,
it needs to be answered why we need an MTD method
when we have other defensive measures like IPsec. The
MTD method is necessary because IPsec with an Internet key
VOLUME 6, 2018

exchange method, like IKEv2, is a computer program that
could be threatened by zero-day vulnerabilities. For example,
a UDP port needs to be open to start IPsec/IKE. This open port
can be targeted by DoS attacks or buffer overflow vulnerabilities [36]. Therefore, one efficient way is preventing a system
from being targeted for attacks, i.e., preventing attacks at the
reconnaissance step instead of letting attackers to find the
system and its open ports and start testing different ways to
penetrate. More clearly, the proposed idea is moving around
(in the vast address space of IPv6) as fast as possible instead
of staying in the same place to be targeted by attackers. Note
that we use IPsec/IKEv2 in the proposed method as a Defense
in Depth and to remove permanent IP addresses to improve
privacy and anonymity. However, attackers need to find the
dynamic IP addresses of our systems in the first step, a task
which is not easy to accomplish. For example, with less than
half a second round-trip time between two hosts, we can
dynamically change their IP addresses in an unpredictable
way every two seconds. This way, attackers need to find the
current IP addresses between about 18 quintillion choices
(if we use 64 bits of IPv6 address size for the interface
identifier) in less than two seconds. This is nearly impossible
with currently existing computing and network resources.
Therefore, even an unpatched implementation of IPsec/IKE
with well-known vulnerabilities cannot be easily targeted in
the proposed method.
Mobile IPv6 [12] is employed as the base of the proposed
method. The hosts (hereafter referred to as MN1 and MN2)
act like MNs of Mobile IPv6. HoAs of the MNs are used as the
permanent IP addresses to be transparent to the upper layers.
CoAs of the MNs are used as the dynamic IP addresses of the
hosts. Random IP address rotator is implemented to change
the CoAs for moving targets dynamically. Other reasons that
Mobile IPv6 is selected are:
• Mobile IPv6 enables each host to cache the binding of a
permanent peer’s IP address with its dynamic IP address
and then send all packets destined for the peer directly
to it using this dynamic IP address.
• Binding update mechanism is used to inform each host
of the current peer’s dynamic IP address.
• Hosts use the new peer’s dynamic IP address only after
receiving the BU message from the peer. So this new IP
address has already been successfully registered by the
peer. Therefore, there is no chance for packet loss due to
address collision.
Note that accessibility of HoAs (permanent IP addresses)
through the Internet leaves the hosts vulnerable to be targeted.
This accessibility is only possible via the HAs. Therefore,
the HAs should be removed in the proposed method. However, the HAs are needed for the return routability procedure
to test the HoAs. To solve this issue, we should use another
method that does not require the return routability procedure. For this purpose, as another contribution of this work,
we utilize RFC 4449 [37] along with IPsec and IKEv2 in
order to create a Secure Route Optimization (SRO) method
without the HA participation. SRO is not only useful for our
33333
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MTD but also can be used for other applications of Mobile
IPv6. More specifically, if the MN is trustable, SRO can be
employed to decrease signaling overhead and remove the HA
participation. This new method is explained in details next.
In RFC 4449, a static shared key method is presented
to omit all messages related to the return routability procedure. We leverage this approach, which results in significant
improvements. An MN can update the peer with a new CoA
directly because the HA is not involved in the route optimization mechanism. Another improvement is decreasing
signaling overhead because only BU and BA packets are
needed. Along with these advantages, the static shared key
method also has some limitations:
• The peer needs to trust the actions of the MN and needs
to assume that the MN will not launch flooding attacks
against a third party as described in [38].
• Static shared symmetric keys between the peer hosts
are needed. Therefore, this method cannot resist replay
attacks.
To solve the first issue, we assume that both parties are
trustable. This is not a restrictive assumption, as the peers
in the problem subject to investigation are actually trustable.
To address the second issue, we combine RFC 4449 with
IPsec and IKEv2 between both parties because IKEv2 can
provide automatic key distribution/rekeying and protection
against replay attacks.
In SRO, BU/BA messages are protected by IPsec, so the
binding authorization data (and nonce indices options) are
not needed in the mobility header (the extension header of
IPv6) [12]. However, the receiver needs a way to verify the
claimed identity (CoA in the source of IPv6 packet) of the
sender. We have two solutions for this authentication requirement:
• Using Authentication Header (AH) besides Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP).
• Using Alternate Care-of Address option for BU messages encrypted by ESP.
As the default, we propose to use IPsec ESP in transport
mode for encrypting both signaling and data packets. Therefore, between the two options, the second one has a better
performance. In this way, a copy of the CoA, which is used
in the source of IPv6 packet, is automatically encrypted by
ESP. Note that the alternate care-of address option is a part
of mobility header that is automatically encrypted by ESP.
Mobility header format for BU and BA packets are shown
in Fig. 1.
We still have a problem with removing HAs because
according to the standard Mobile IPv6, each MN should send
a BU message to the HoA of another MN. This packet is
received by the HA of the destination MN and is tunneled to
that MN as illustrated in Fig. 2. After that, they can communicate using their CoAs without the participation of the HAs.
If an MN changes its CoA, it should subsequently send a BU
message to the HoA of another MN. To solve this problem
and have the process given by Fig. 3, instead of the one given
33334

FIGURE 1. Mobility header format for (a) binding update message and
(b) binding acknowledgement message.

FIGURE 2. Standard Binding Update process between two MNs.

by Fig. 2, each MN should check the Binding Cache when it
wants to send a BU message. Therefore, MNs can send BU
messages directly to the CoA of the peer without using HAs.
We also need to force MNs to check the BUL before sending
BA messages in order not to use their HoAs as the source of
BA messages.
Other modifications in the standard Mobile IPv6 protocol
for the proposed method are presented below:
VOLUME 6, 2018
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FIGURE 3. Binding Update process using Binding Cache between
two MNs.

IPsec is leveraged for encryption and as a proof of HoA
ownership for SRO process. In this way, receiving a BU
message protected by IPsec is a proof of HoA ownership.
Note that when IPsec is used between two peers, every
packet de facto contains a simple piece of information
(Security Parameter Index) that gives access to address
information (HoAs) for both peers and the shared key.
Through the use of SRO process HAs are not needed,
and consequently, the HoAs (permanent IP addresses)
are not accessible.
• Each new CoA is created and announced by a BU
message before removing the previous CoA. In fact,
the previous CoA will be removed after receiving the
BA message from the peer. More specifically, each
MN constantly generates a new CoA and registers it
after checking against current occupancy (via a Neighbor Solicitation message). Then the MN sends a Ping
Request packet from the new CoA to the IP address
of its home router. In this way, the new CoA (with the
MAC address) is stored in the table of the home router
(to avoid any delay for the first packet with this CoA
as its destination). Following the Mobile IPv6 protocol,
the MN sends a BU message, and after receiving the
relevant BA message, the MN will remove the previous
CoA.
Using the proposed method, remote attacks that need to
target specific IP address can be prevented. However, we still
have a problem with two other types of attacks: (1) black
hole attack as a part of DoS attacks (in which a compromised router on the path between two hosts discards packets
instead of forwarding them) and (2) bandwidth depletion
DDoS attack (that only needs the subnet ID instead of the
exact IPv6 address of a target). To prevent these attacks we
•
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FIGURE 4. IP address rotator flowchart.

need to have more than one path between hosts. For example,
consider an MN that has two different physical interfaces, one
connected to a Cellular link and the other to an Ethernet link.
In turn, the MN is connected to two routers that act as foreign
networks in Mobile IPv6. In this case, the MN can quickly
switch between these two links. For this purpose, the MN
needs to register its next CoA on the second link and updates
the peer with this new CoA. Therefore, the subsequent data
packets will be sent and received through the second link.
Hence, the handover delay because of changing links is zero.
As a suggestion, a keepalive signal can be used between two
MNs to check that the link between them is operating. If the
link is broken or the link delay is more than a threshold, each
peer can switch between their routers. As another suggestion,
the second link can always be used as a redundant path.
The IPv6 address prefixes of routers of each path should be
stored as different preferences to implement additional paths.
When switching between paths is needed, each host needs
to switch between IPv6 address prefix preferences. Note that
in our modification the old CoA should still be accessible
until receiving the BA message from the peer host for the new
CoA. Therefore, the probability of packet dropping due to the
change of paths (subnets) is zero.
The flowchart of IP address rotator is shown in Fig. 4.
A new generated CoA should be tested to make sure that
it is a free IP address by sending a Neighbor Solicitation
message. The default waiting time to detect an address
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collision can be calculated as 1.5 times the value of
RetransTimer (default: 1 second), times the value of DupAddrDetectTransmits (default: 1). RetransTimer and DupAddrDetectTransmits are specified in Neighbor Discovery for IP
version 6 [39] and Stateless Address Autoconfiguration [34],
respectively. So, if a Neighbor Advertisement message is
not received within 1.5 seconds, the CoA will be registered.
To remove any delay, the new CoA will be added to the router
table by sending a Ping Request message from this new CoA
to the IP address of the router. When the router receives the
ping request, it will send a Neighbor Solicitation message
because it does not have the new CoA in its table. Upon
receiving the Neighbor Advertisement message from the MN,
the router will send back a Ping Reply message. Now the new
CoA is registered and ready to use. After that, a BU message
is sent to the peer host. If the BA message is not received
(as the confirmation of the BU message) after two retries
(number of retries depends on the network parameters), a new
CoA should be created on the next router (if exists). Recall
that the previous CoA is removed after receiving BA message
from the peer host.
Ws in the flowchart is the waiting time for the next shuffling
period. The fastest shuffling interval can occur if we select
zero for Ws . Note that the length of Ws is a network parameter
that can be selected independently and dynamically on each
peer host. The shorter Ws , the more signaling overhead but,
the more resilient to attacks. As a suggestion, a longer Ws can
be selected as the default value and if an attack or suspicious
activity is detected by anomaly-based or signature-based
detection strategies, Ws should be decreased. The minimum
shuffling interval is suggested in this study to be calculated
by the following equation.
(Pc + 1) × (Tc + 1.5s + 2 × RTT (MNi , Routeri ))
+ Te + RTT (MN 1, MN 2)

(1)

where RTT (MN 1, MN 2) equals the mean round-trip time
between MN1 and MN2. Tc is the mean calculation time for
generating a random IP address and creating packets. Te is
the time needed for encrypting a BU packet by IPsec. Pc
is the probability of address collision. To estimate the minimum shuffling interval, we should note that Pc is very small
because of the huge address space of IPv6. Furthermore,
Tc and Te are negligible in comparison with the network
delay. Therefore, according to (1), if RTT (MN 1, MN 2) 
RTT (MNi , Routeri ), then, 1.5s + RTT (MN 1, MN 2) dominates the minimum shuffling interval.
The final scheme of the proposed method is shown
in Fig. 5. Recall that this method is a combination of Mobile
IPv6, IPsec with IKE_v2, and multiple CoAs registration. We
next explain the initialization steps, security, and privacy of
the proposed method.
A. INITIALIZATION STEPS

In this subsection, we present the initialization steps to start
the communication between peer hosts (MNs). In the first
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FIGURE 5. Final scheme of the proposed method.

step, the HoA of each MN should have a prefix different from
that of the MN’s subnet received by Route Advertisement
messages. As such, the MNs will see themselves sitting in
foreign networks and will subsequently register default CoAs
in these networks. In the next step, a manual exchange of
configuration information is needed that includes a default
CoA of the peer and pre-shared key. Default CoAs are used to
set the first entries of the Binding Cache and the BUL in both
MNs. The pre-shared key is used for IKE_AUTH Exchange
of IKE_v2. Note that other methods of authentication can
also be used for IKE_v2 instead of the pre-shared key. These
methods of authentication include RSA certificates, elliptic
curve digital signature algorithm certificates, and extensible
authentication protocol. After these two steps, the MNs can
start the IP address rotator to change their CoAs.
If one of the peers (MN1) reboots, another peer (MN2)
should use its default CoA and wait for the first packet from
MN1. Then both of them can start the IP address rotator.
The reboot of a peer can be detected by not receiving BA
messages or the keepalive signal (if any) through all existing
paths.
B. SECURITY OF MOBILE IPv6

Here we explain some possible attacks against the standard Mobile IPv6 route optimization mechanism [38]. Furthermore, we compare protection solutions used by Mobile
IPv6 and the proposed method.
First, if the route optimization mechanism was not authenticated, an attacker could send spoofed BU messages from
anywhere on the Internet. As a result, the attacker could
redirect all packets between the MN and CNs to itself (attack
against secrecy and integrity) or an arbitrary IP address
(flooding attack). In Mobile IPv6, these types of attacks are
not possible due to the use of authentication in the return
routability procedure. The proposed method is also resistant
to these types of attacks because of using SRO that leverages
VOLUME 6, 2018
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IPsec for authenticating BU messages. Recall that ESP header
encrypts the alternate care-of address option of each BU
message. In this way, a receiver can authenticate each BU
message by comparing the source IP address in the packet
header with the encrypted IP address in the alternate care-of
address option.
Second, one of the most critical attacks against the standard
Mobile IPv6 is the inducing of unnecessary binding updates.
Unfortunately, the use of authenticated BU messages cannot
prevent this type of attack. The impact of the attack becomes
more severe as more resources are consumed by the route
optimization mechanism. According to default parameters of
Mobile IPv6 protocol, when an MN receives a packet from a
new CN via its HA, the MN should start the return routability
procedure. This procedure is initiated by creating a new entry
in the BUL and sending two packets to the CN (the Home
Test Init and Care-of Test Init). These two packets will be
retransmitted if the MN does not receive Home Test and Careof Test packets from the CN after a retransmission interval. The retransmission interval is based on an exponential
back-off process in which the initial retransmission timer is
set to INITIAL_BINDACK_TIMEOUT (default: 1 second)
and is doubled upon each retransmission until the timeout period reaches the value MAX_BINDACK_TIMEOUT
(default: 32 seconds). This process is finished after 210 seconds as the default lifetime of the BUL entry (MAX
_TOKEN_LIFETIME) [12].
An attacker can exploit the retransmission process by sending a spoofed packet to the HoA of an MN. The spoofed
packet should look like as if it comes from a new CN. This
packet is tunneled to the MN via its HA. Once the MN
receives the packet, it starts the route optimization mechanism
with this fake CN. As a result, the MN repeats sending two
packets eleven times and subsequently removes the entry
from its BUL. Therefore, if an attacker induces an MN to
initiate the route optimization mechanism with a non-existent
CN, the MN will send 22 packets while keeping the corresponding entry in the table for 210 seconds. In practice,
the attacker would trigger the MN to initiate a large number
of route optimizations with fake CNs.
We simulated this attack against the standard Mobile IPv6.
For this purpose, we used Scapy [40], a powerful interactive
packet manipulation program, to send some Ping Request
packets with a random IP address in the source of the packet.
The prefix of these random addresses was the same as the
attacker’s address prefix to avoid ingress filtering. In this test,
we created a flooding attack for 32 seconds with 12,800 Ping
Request packets to the HoA of an MN. In our experiments,
the MN sent a Ping Reply packet per each received request
packet and also sent 281,600 (12,800×22) packets during
the retransmission process of the return routability procedure.
Therefore, forcing the MN to send 294,400 (281, 600 +
12, 800 Ping Reply) packets during 242 seconds was the
result of this attack.
However, it is not possible to launch this attack against
the proposed method because we do not use any HA and
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FIGURE 6. Sending packets processing flowchart.

accordingly, peers are not accessible by their HoAs. Hence,
even though the Mobile IPv6 is used, the above vulnerability
is not inherited by the proposed method. This is a significant
result in terms of security of the method.
C. PRIVACY IMPROVEMENT VIA IPsec

When an MN (MN1) wants to send a data packet to another
MN (MN2), it will have already supplied the HoAs as the
source and destination addresses in the packet header. Next,
MN1 checks the BUL to see if it has already sent a BU
message to MN2. If it is found, MN1 includes its CoA in the
home address option. MN1 then checks its binding cache to
see if MN2 has sent a BU message to MN1. If it is found,
MN1 constructs a routing header type 2 and places the CoA
of MN2 inside this header. The packet with HoAs in the
source and destination addresses of the header reaches IPsec.
After encrypting and adding headers, the home address option
is swapped with the source address and the routing header
type 2 is swapped with the destination address of the packet
header. When the packet is received by MN2, the headers
are processed in the order that they appear in the packet.
Therefore, HoAs are inserted in the source and destination
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between peers to define SPIs (a total of four messages) to start
IKEv2. After that, we can remove HoAs in the source peer
and retrieve them via SPIs in the destination peer. Therefore,
the destination option header/the routing header type 2 are
only needed for the first four messages. Recall that a preshared key can be used for IKE_AUTH Exchange that is the
first step of IKEv2. The details are out of the scope of this
paper.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION RESULTS

FIGURE 7. Received packets processing flowchart.

addresses of the packet header before the packet reaches
IPsec. In this way, the IPsec implementation always sees
HoAs in the source and destination addresses of the packet
header. Note that it is the best to use HoAs as the selectors in
IPsec to avoid changing the Security Association (SA) every
time a new CoA is defined [41, pp. 116–119].
According to the standard implementation of Mobile
IPv6 and IPsec, when a packet is on the path, the source and
destination addresses in the header are CoAs of MN1 and
MN2. However, IPsec does not encrypt the routing header
type 2 and the home address option that show HoAs of
the source and destination. To improve the privacy, we can
resolve this problem by removing the destination option
header (and the routing header type 2) from all packets.
Note that the Security Parameter Index (SPI) found in the
ESP header is sufficient to get access to the HoAs (the real
source/destination of a packet). The highlighted parts in the
flowcharts in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 show our modification in the
standard MN operation with IPsec (HAO and RH2 in these
flowcharts are the home address option and the routing header
type 2, respectively). The packet format before and after
removing the destination option header/the routing header
type 2 are shown in Fig. 8.
We propose the use of IKEv2 as a standard method for
key management. IKEv2 can improve the security of IPsec
and prevent replay attacks. Some negotiations should be done
33338

A proof of concept prototype implementation of the proposed
method is developed to prove the validity and evaluate the
performance of the design. In our prototype, we used OpenPLC [42], an open source PLC runs on a RaspberryPi minicomputer running Raspbian Jessie. OpenPLC is networked
through a set of routers (using Modbus/TCP) to an open
source HMI software (ScadaBR [43]) installed on a desktop
computer containing 2.4GHz Intel Core 2 Duo CPU with
4GB DDR2 800MHz RAM running Ubuntu 14.04. Linux
kernel version 3.8.2 with enabled mobility options is compiled and installed on both devices. An open source implementation of Mobile IPv6 (UMIP) for Linux is used. Some
changes have been done on the original UMIP to support the
proposed method. Both devices act like MNs of Mobile IPv6.
Router R1 is used as the heart of the Internet. The WAN ports
of other routers (R2, R3, and R4) are connected to the LAN
ports of R1. To test the prevention of bandwidth depletion
DDoS attacks, we used an extra path between OpenPLC
and R1. OpenPLC is connected to both R3 and R4 via two
network interfaces. We used a USB network adapter to add an
extra network interface to OpenPLC. In the configuration file
of UMIP (on OpenPLC), stored in /usr/local/etc/mip6d.conf,
we listed both interfaces with two preference numbers. The
preference number of the interface connected to R3 is the
smallest one (highest priority). Therefore, OpenPLC uses the
path through R3 as the default path to R1.
The prefix of each HoA is different from the prefix received
by Route Advertisement messages. So both devices (MNs)
see themselves sitting in foreign networks and subsequently
register CoAs in these networks. The network topology of
the testbed is illustrated in Fig. 9. A function is added to
the source code of UMIP for changing CoAs of the MNs
every 10 seconds. We compared this new version of MTM6D
(MTM6D II) with the previous version of MTM6D [8] and
MT6D method [29]. Having zero packet loss in MTM6D II is
the best advantage in comparison with MTM6D as explained
in Section VI-B.
A. OVERHEAD

There are two types of overheads in MTM6D II. First, there
is some signaling overhead; some extra packets are used due
to the CoA notification process (binding update procedure),
which involves the BU and the BA messages. The ACK bit
of each BU message forces the peer host to send back a BA
message as a confirmation. This process ensures that the peer
host receives the BU message and updates its binding cache
VOLUME 6, 2018
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FIGURE 8. Packet format before (a) and after (b) removing the destination option header and the routing header type 2.

FIGURE 9. The network topology of the testbed.

entry before removing the previous CoA by the sender. Each
round of changing IP address needs two message transmissions at each MN (BU and BA messages). As presented in
Section V, we do not use any HA in the proposed method
in order to prevent access to HoAs, i.e., the permanent IP
addresses of peers through the Internet. Therefore, SRO is
used as the route optimization method that does not need
the participation of any HA. Considering the mobility header
format for BU and BA messages (shown in Fig. 1) and
the use of SPI of ESP header for removing the destination
option header and the routing header type 2 (presented in
Section V-C), we can calculate the size of BU/BA packets:
BU : 14B(Ethernetheader) + 40B(IPv6header)
+ 24B(IPsec(ESP)) + 32B(Mobilityheader) = 110B.
(2)
BA : 14B(Ethernetheader) + 40B(IPv6header)
+ 24B(IPsec(ESP)) + 16B(Mobilityheader) = 94B.
(3)
Therefore, the total signaling overhead to update a peer
host with a new CoA is 204 bytes. For example, if each host
changes its CoA every 10 seconds, the signaling overhead is
40.8B/sec. In the standard implementation of Mobile IPv6,
the BU and BA messages are 110 bytes each. Note that instead
of IPsec header, they have the routing header type 2 and
the home address option in each signaling packet. However, in the standard Mobile IPv6, there are also four extra
messages due to the use of the return routability procedure.
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Therefore, the overhead of route optimization in the original Mobile IPv6 is equal to 660 bytes (in comparison with
204 bytes in the proposed method).
Second, there is transmission overhead; each data packet
transmission between hosts has some overhead. For each data
packet, we have 24 extra bytes of overhead due to the use of
IPsec with ESP protocol. Note, however, that the additional
bytes that come from the use of IPsec are not caused by
the proposed method. Any secure communication utilizing
IPsec ESP would incur the same overhead. On the other
hand, MT6D encapsulates each packet using UDP to hide
the original IP addresses and uses virtual IP addresses. The
overhead of MT6D equals 62 bytes [29]. In MT6D encapsulation, the Ethernet header is also overwritten to anonymize
the MAC addresses. However, the proposed method does
not have any MAC address anonymity because the packet
source MAC address will be changed automatically when it is
received by the first router. For a fair comparison, we assume
only 48 bytes overhead (IPv6 header and UDP header) for
MT6D.
To compare the overhead of MT6D and the proposed
method, different shuffling intervals (t) are used. Let Oi be
the overhead per each packet for method i and N be the mean
number of packets per second, then we have:


408B
OMTM 6D II = 24B +
.
(4)
N ×t
Recall that OMT 6D = 48B. So OMT 6D < OMTM 6D II if
(N × t) < 17.
This comparison is shown in Fig. 10. We used three different shuffling intervals for MTM6D II in this comparison.
Two seconds is used as an approximation to the minimum
value. Furthermore, 10 seconds is used as the default value
in MT6D. One minute is also used as an example for a long
shuffling interval. According to these calculations, when the
shuffling interval equals 10 seconds (as an example) and
the mean number of packets per second is greater than 1.7,
the overhead per packet of the proposed method is less than
MT6D.
B. HANDOFF DELAY

In MTM6D and MTM6D II when an MN changes its CoA,
it should update the peer with the new CoA. MTM6D has
a small window of vulnerability during the handoff delay
because packets sent by the peer (addressed to now-defunct
CoA) could not be delivered. However, in MTM6D II, we use
multiple CoAs such that the old CoA is kept alive until the
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TABLE 1. UDP packet loss rate.

FIGURE 10. Overhead per packet as a function of number of packets
per second.

FIGURE 12. Percentage of TCP packets delivered over time in MTM6D and
MTM6D II.

high latency scenario. We assumed 600 ms as the round-trip
time in our implementations.
1) UDP TEST

For this test, we selected one MN to transmit UDP packets
to another MN. As mentioned earlier, the time duration for
updating the peer equals 600 ms. We used 10 seconds as
the shuffling interval for both MTM6D II and MTM6D.
Therefore, the handoff delay ratio equals (0.600/10) = 6%.
In MTM6D, all data packets are lost during the handoff, but,
in MTM6D II the packet loss rate equals zero. Table 1 shows
the experimental results for various numbers of UDP packets
per second generated by a traffic generator.
FIGURE 11. Zero packet loss during the handoff delay.

new CoA has been received by the peer. The old CoA is
removed once the peer node sends back the BA message
showing that the new CoA is saved in the peer. Recall that
the handoff delay equals the round-trip time between peers
(connection latency times two). Fig. 11 illustrates this process. In this figure, CoAi is the current CoA of MNi. One IP
address rotation of MN1 is shown in the figure.
In MT6D each host maintains three addresses: the previous
interval address, the current interval address, and the next
interval address to eliminate any packet loss during handoff
delay. To better understand the effect of handoff delay on the
communication, we compared MTM6D II with MTM6D in a
33340

2) TCP TEST

For TCP test, one MN is utilized to send 1000 TCP packets
per second (each 500B) to another MN. Shuffling interval equals 10 seconds. In MTM6D, the handoff delay has
an important effect on the throughput. During the handoff
delay, TCP experiences timeout and resends the unacknowledged packets and goes to slow start. However, in the proposed method we do not have any packet loss. As shown
in Fig. 12, the ratio of delivered TCP packets to the sent
packets equals 22.96% for MTM6D (in comparison with
100% in MTM6D II).
C. BANDWIDTH DEPLETION DDoS ATTACKS
PREVENTION TEST

As explained in Section V, remote attacks that need to know
their intended target’s IP address can be prevented by rotating
VOLUME 6, 2018
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TABLE 2. Comparison between MTM6D II and MT6D.

FIGURE 13. Percentage of TCP packets delivered over time with and
without DDoS mitigation method.

the IP address. However, not all remote attacks need to know
the exact IP address of their target(s). In fact, remote attacks
could occur against routers on the path between two connected nodes. Using IPsec with IKE_v2 adds confidentiality,
integrity, and replay attacks protection. Therefore, attackers
will only be able to increase the network delay by bandwidth
depletion DDoS attacks. Because of the mobility support
feature of MTM6D II, a node can switch between multiple
paths (if exists) if it detects an extra network delay without
disrupting TCP sessions or dropping data packets.
For this test, we connected a switch (as an input) and a
lamp (as an output) to OpenPLC. A simple PLC program is
uploaded to OpenPLC to turn on and off the lamp based on the
status of the switch. The HMI (installed on the desktop computer) sends a query message (every 200 ms) to OpenPLC to
read the status of the switch. As the response, OpenPLC sends
back a response message to the HMI. The default round-trip
time between the peers in this test is 100 ms. To simulate a
bandwidth depletion DDoS attack, we manually (via a script
code) increased the network delay on R3 (the default router
of OpenPLC). In fact, from 50 seconds after the start of this
test, the network delay is doubled per second. Therefore,
the round-trip time between the peers starts from 100 ms and
increases to 200 ms at the 50th second, 400 ms at the 51st
second, 800 ms at the 52nd second and so forth.
Two scenarios are considered: (1) MTM6D II with DDoS
Mitigation and (2) MTM6D II without DDoS Mitigation.
In the first scenario, a keepalive signal (ping requests) is used
to check that the link between the peers are operating and the
network delay is below a threshold (150 ms). OpenPLC sends
a ping request packet every second to measure the network
delay of the current path. OpenPLC detects a delay above the
threshold after the 50th second and decides to use another
path through R4. Therefore, OpenPLC registers a new CoA
VOLUME 6, 2018

on R4 and sends a BU packet to the HMI and after that OpenPLC switches from R3 to R4. In the second scenario, we did
not implement the DDoS mitigation method. The comparison
between these two scenarios is shown in Fig. 13. Please note
that applying the black hole attack has a similar result of
increasing the network delay on R3 to a large number.
Table 2 shows a brief comparison between the proposed
MTD method (MTM6D II) and MT6D (the closest method).
Significant improvements can be seen in terms of security,
availability, flexibility, independence, etc. Interested readers
are referred to Sections I and II for more details on the
comparison.
D. WORK IN PROGRESS

To test the security enhancements completed on the OpenPLC
system a set of cyber-attacks will be developed. We will
develop a set of cyber-attacks which match the threat model
from Section III. The cyber-attacks will be ported to target our testbed. Existing cyber-attacks are available to scan
for and enumerate SCADA systems, inject, alter and replay
control and sensor measurement network packets, and to
cause a denial of service. Each existing cyber-attack will be
reviewed and either ported or replaced with a similar attack
targeting the testbed. A metric will be developed to measure
the effectiveness of each cyber-attack. We believe that all of
these cyber-attacks will not be effective when MTM6D II is
implemented.
VII. CONCLUSION

In this paper, we presented a framework for building a
secure and private peer to peer communication for SCADA
networks with a novel Mobile IPv6 based Moving Target
Defense strategy. We showed that our approach, MTM6D
II, can help thwart remote cyber-attacks against peer hosts
by making the hosts difficult to be found. Towards this
purpose, dynamic random IP addresses are used instead of
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static permanent IP addresses. Furthermore, we utilize RFC
4449 along with IPsec with IKEv2 for creating a secure route
optimization (SRO) method without the participation of any
HA. Applications of this new route optimization method are
not limited to the proposed MTD method but also can be
used for other applications of Mobile IPv6. Removing the
destination option header (and the routing header type 2) from
all packets is proposed to improve privacy and anonymity
for communicating hosts and decrease overhead. As another
security improvement, using additional paths between the
peer hosts with the ability to switch between these paths
without any delay or packet loss is proposed to combat black
hole and bandwidth depletion DDoS attacks. Use of the
combination of standard protocols instead of creating a new
protocol made the proposed method to be independent of a
specific algorithm or key size for encryption, authentication,
and key distribution. This portability feature makes it easy
to implement this method for different applications. The end
result is a solution that may also be combined with existing
defensive measures to form a robust Defense in Depth solution.
Although the results presented in this work claimed to
outperform the recent results of the MT6D method, the scalability issue of both methods remains to be investigated. The
most significant part of future work is adopting the presented
MTD method to support one-to-many and many-to-many
communications.
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